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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CELEBRITY CLUB, INC., a Utah 
nonprofit corporation, 
Petitioner, BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
v. 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION, Case No. 16083 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner seeks relief from a decision of the Utah 
Liquor Control Commission denying Petitioner's application for 
a license to establish a state liquor store on the premises 
of Petitioner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION 
Petitioner seeks a Order from this Court directing 
Respondent to issue to Petitioner a license to establish a 
state liquor store on its premises. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner is a nonprofit social club which applied 
to Respondent for the issuance of a license for the establish-
ment of a state liquor store on the premises of Petitioner 
at 1037 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Prior to Res-
pendent's decision on Petitioner's application and prior to 
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the construction of necessary improvements required by sta-
tute and by rules and regulations of Respondent (e.g., see 
§16-6-13(6), Utah Code Annotated requiring extensive kit-
chen and dining facilities), Petitioner contacted Compliance 
Agents of Respondent regarding the question of whether or 
not the 600 foot proscription in §16-6-13.5 and §32-l-36.15, 
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1977) is applicable. Inquiry was 
made because of the location of a private school. The en-
trance to the school is at 3370 South 900 East, well beyond 
the proscription, but the school property extends into the 
interior portions of the block, thus prompting the inquiry. 
Agents of the Respondent made physical inspections 
of the area and advised Petitioner verbally that the proposed 
location of the state liquor store would have to be changed 
to exceed 600 feet. Petitioner changed the proposed location 
pursuant to the direction of the Compliance Agents. 
Physical inspection again was made and Petitioners 
were advised verbally that the new location of the proposed 
state liquor store was not within 600 feet of the school and 
that a license could issue upon Petitioner satisfying num-
erous other conditions. Measurement was made from the near-
est corner of the playground adjacent to the school building 
-2-
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to the location of the proposed state liquor store. The dis-
tance is 622 feet. 
The points from which the measurement was made 
were in accordance with an opinion of the Utah Attorney Gen-
eral. See Exhibit 2 attached to the Stipulation of Facts 
submitted in this matter. 
By letter dated the 16th day of September, 1977, 
Petitioner again was advised by an agent of Respondent whose 
job it was to determine if applicable requirements are sat-
isfied that Petitioner's facility "satisfies the 600 foot re-
quirement." See Exhibit 1. 
Subsequent to the repeated verbal and written re-
presentations of Respondent, and in reliance thereon, Petitioner 
completed the club facility at a cost of nearly $200,000.00. 
Petitioner completed its formal application to 
Respondent and filed it with Respondent on the 21st day of 
February, 1978. 
On the 28th day of March, 1978, the Utah Attorney 
General published a new opinion changing the point of refer-
ence from which the measurement is to be made. Exhibit 4. 
Rather than measuring from the location of the proposed state 
liquor store as directed in the prior opinion, it was deter-
mined that the measurement is to be made from the nearest 
-3-
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outside wall of the building in which the club is located, 
Measuring in this manner, the club is not beyond 600 feet. 
On the 15th day of September, 1978, Respondent 
denied Petitioner's application solely on the basis that 
the 600 foot requirement was not satisfied. Petitioner's 
application fully satisfied all other statutory requirements 
and all rules and regulations of the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, and there were and now are licenses available. 
A survey made in connection with some additional 
property owned by the school, but not used as a playground 
and not having a ''school building" on it, was submitted. 
Exhibit 5, The property has a storage shed on it. The club 
facility is not beyond 600 feet of the nearest point of said 
additional property. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE APPLICABLE SURVEY IS THE ONE SUB-
MITTED BY PETITIONER WHICH USES AS ONE 
POINT OF REFERENCE THE NEAREST BOUNDARY 
OF THE PLAYGROUND TO THE CLUB FACILITY. 
Two surveys were submitted to the Utah Liquor Con-
trol Commission. The first survey used as the point of re-
ference with respect to the school the nearest boundary of 
the playground to the club facility. The second survey used 
as a point of reference the nearest boundary of property owned 
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by the school but which is not a playground and which has no 
school building on it. 
Confusion may have resulted because of the existence 
in the record of the second surve~. 
The second survey should be disregarded. Petitioner 
and both opinions of the Attorney General (and presumably the 
Respondent pursuant to said opinions) have recognized the 
nearest point of the playground adjacent to the school build-
ing as one of the two applicable points of reference. 
The first opinion sought to interpret Utah Code 
Annotated §32-l-36.15 (Supp. 1977) which provides: 
"No state store or package agency 
shall be established within a radius of 
600 feet of any public or private 
school, church, library, public play-
ground or park. " 
After discussing whether the term "school" relates 
only to the school building proper or to the school build-
ing and surrounding playgrounds, the opinion concluded: 
" ... [T]he point of measurement to be 
used in the case of a school is the 
nearest wall of the school building if 
there is no playground, or the nearest 
point of the building or the boundary 
of the school playground where a school 
playground exists." 
-5-
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The second opinion quoted with approval tho lan-
guage of the first. While it may be argued that both opin-
ions erroneously include playgrounds and that measurement 
should be made from the nearest point of the school building 
proper, it certainly has never been the position of the 
Attorney General that the measurement should be made from 
property owned by the school but not used as a playground 
and not having a school building on it. 
Having used improper points of reference with re-
spect to the school, the Court should disregard the second 
survey and apply the first which measured from the nearest 
boundary of the playground. Both the Compliance Agents of 
Respondent and Petitioner have consistently approached the 
matter on the basis of such a point of reference. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE APPLICABLE POINT OF REFERENCE 
WITH RESPECT TO THE CLUB FACILITY 
IS THE LOCATION OF THE PROPOSED 
STATE LIQUOR STORE RATHER THAN THE 
NEAREST WALL OF THE BUILDING IN 
WHICH THE CLUB FACILITY IS LOCATED. 
Unfortunately, while the applicable statutes clearly 
set forth a 600 foot limitation, they offer little guidance as 
to the points from which the measurement is to be made. That 
there is considerable difference of opinion regarding the ma~ 
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ner in which a designated number of feet is to be measured 
is demonstrated in numerous cases dealing with the problem. 
In attempting to delineate the manner in which the 
distance between two establishments is to be measured, the 
controlling statutes and the Courts which have construed those 
statutes have been less than consistent. 
Measurement along the shortest route of ordinary 
traffic has been one approach. In State Beverage Department 
v. Brentwood Assembly of God Church, 149 So. 2d 871 (1963) the 
applicable statute specified such a measurement but the Court 
still was forced to define "the shortest route of ordinary 
pedestrian travel." See also Hunt Club, Inc. v. Moberly, 
407 S.W. 2d 148 (Ky. ) where the licensed premises 
were deemed not to be within the 200 foot proscription though 
the rear portions of the two buildings were within 200 feet. 
A measurement in a straight line also has been con-
sidered the appropriate means of determining distance E.g. see 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. State 
Board of Equalization, 37 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1934). 
Once it has been determined that the measurement is 
to be along a route of pedestrian traffic, or in a straight 
line, or according to some other formula, the interpretation of 
-7-
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a statute is not complete for it must be further expanded to 
include the points at which the measurement is to begin and e'.:. 
Again, inconsistency reigns. The Courts have ador"tE: 
measurements from front door to front door, curb to curb, buiL-
ing to building, property line to property line and various 
combinations of these terminal points. See 4 A.L.R. 3d 1250 
and the cases cited therein for a treatment of the subject. 
Against the backdrop of the lack of consistency in 
judicial interpretation and because of the failure of the Utah 
Legislature to definitively state the manner in which a measure-
ment is to be made, the Utah Liquor Control Commission asked 
the Utah Attorney General for guidance. 
By written opinion dated the 15th day of November, 
1976 (see Exhibit 2 to the Stipulation of Facts), the Utah 
Attorney General determined that the proper measurement is a 
straight line betwee~ the nearest point on the boundary of t~ 
playground, if a playground exists, to the proposed site oft~ 
state liquor store. 
The opinion is founded on reason and Petitioner su~ 
mits it should be adopted by this Court. 
At the conclusion of the opinion it is stated: 
"Legal basis for contrary interpret-
ations does exist. For this reason 
if this opinion is not in keeping with 
the legislature's intent in enacting 
the above cited section ample opportunity 
will exist to clarify said intent in the 
upcoming legislative session." [Emphasis added:. 
-8-
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The 1977 ligislative session did nothing to alter 
the interpretation of the Attorney General. Therefore, it is 
believed by Petitioner that the opinion reflects the intent of 
the legislature. 
Both the Petitioner and the Utah Liquor Control Com-
mission conducted themselves in accordance with the first op-
inion for a period well in excess of one year and during the 
entire period Petitioner was constructing the club facility. 
The second opinion of the Attorney General was pub-
lished more than a year and four months after the first opinion; 
it was no better reasoned than the first opinion; the Utah 
Legislature expressed nothing to indicate a change in its in-
tent as expressed in the first opinion; and Petitioner expended 
nearly $200,000.00 in reliance on the first opinion. The sec-
ond opinion of the Attorney General should be rejected as a 
standard for measurement. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO 
DENY A LICENSE TO PETITIONER ON THE 
BASIS OF THE 600 FOOT PROSCRIPTION. 
As has been set forth above, Petitioner contends that 
a proper interpretation of Utah Code Annotated §16-6-13.5 and 
32-1-36.15 (Supp. 1977) results in Petitioner being beyond the 
-9-
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required 600 feet. If this Court were to adopt an interpre-
tation which resulted in a measurement of less than 600 feet 
I 
it is the assertion of Petitioner that fundamental fairness 
dictates that Respondent be estopped to deny a license on the 
basis of the 600 foot limitation. 
Petitioner recognizes that estopped is to be applied 
to governmental entities with great care in that unrestrained 
exercise of the principle may hobble the entity's sovereign 
power. However, it is clear that the doctrine is applicalbe 
to governmental bodies when the underlying facts justify its 
application and where it is necessary to apply the doctrine to 
prevent an injustice. For authorities recognizing that estoppel 
can be invoked against governmental agencies see Surety Savings 
& Loan Association v. State Department of Transportation, Div-
ision of Highways, 195 N.W.2d 464 (Wis. 1972); Palm Gardens, Inc. 
v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 514 P.2d 888 (Or. 1973); 
Mountain States Advertising, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 552 P.~ 
(N.M. 1976); Martinez v. Florida Department of Commerce, 358 So, 
2d 115 (Fla. 1978); Finch v. Mathews, 443 P.2d 833 (Wash. 19681 
People ex. rel. Mac Mullen v. Harrington, 188 N.W. 2d 214 
(Mich. 1971); !lickey v. Illinois Central R. Co., 220 N.E. 2d 41: 
(Ill. 1966). 
-10-
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The cases recognizing that governmental agencies are 
subject to the doctrine of estoppel are legion, although some 
cases refused to apply the principle because the relevant facts 
did not support its application. E.g. see Walker Center Cor-
poration v. State Tax Commission, 20 U.2d 346, 437 P.2d BBB 
(1968) where this Court refused to invoke estoppel because 
"the record does not indicate that the Commission misled the 
Plaintiff in any manner ... " Cf. Palm Gardens, Inc. v. 
Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 514 P.2d BBB (Or. 1973) where 
reliance was not justified because the party had knowledge to 
the contrary of the fact or representation allegedly relied 
upon; Hickey v. Illinois Control R. Co., 220 N.E.2d 415 
(Ill. 1966) where there was mere inaction by the state and not 
positive acts by officials which may have induced action. 
This Court has spoken recently converning the facts 
which would support estoppel against a governmental entity. 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976). 
In refusing to estop the Board because the Plaintiff had actual 
knowledge of certain relevant facts and because the Board had 
done nothing to delude or dissuade Plaintiff from properly 
following required procedure, this Court approved the following 
standard: 
"Estoppel arises when a party (Defendant 
-11-
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Board) by his acts, representations, 
or admissions, or by his silence when 
he ought to speak, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence, induces 
another (Plaintiffs) acting with reason-
able prudence and diligence, relies and 
acts thereon so that he will suffer an 
injustice if the former (Land Board) is 
permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts." 
Having circumscribed the factual requisites necess~~ 
for an application of estoppel, it is clear that the instant 
case is one which meets the most stringent of tests. If the 
facts of this case do not demand that the Respondent be es-
topped, Petitioner submits that the doctrine of estoppel may nc 
longer be considered a viable legal principle in this juris-
diction. 
Did Petitioner act reasonably and prudently? This 
is not a situation where the allegedly aggrieved party (the 
Petitioner) proceeded with its course of conduct and then asser-
ted estoppel because of inaction on the part of the government, 
Rather, prior to expending $200,000.00, Petitioner approached 
Respondent for guidance. Respondent was the only entity Pet-
itioner reas0nably could go to for assistance. In fact, 
Respondent has the exclusive statutory authority to deal with 
the problem. 
Repondent did not fail to act upon being presented 
with the question. Respondent proceeded to give specific di~ 
-12-
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ections with respect to the course of conduct Petitioner was 
to take. The directions did not come from clerks or others 
upon whose advice one could not reasonably rely. The dir-
ections came from personnel whose specific duties included 
making determinations of compliance with statutory require-
ments and with rules and regulations of Respondent. The re-
peated verbal and written assurances of compliance from Respond-
ent were further supported by an opinion of the Attorney General. 
Without doubt, Respondent engaged in affirmative conduct which 
induced Petitioner to act and which Respondent full well kne~ 
would induce Petitioner to act. And surely Petitioner reason-
ably relied on the representations of the Respondent. 
Once Respondent made a determination that Petitioner 
could proceed as directed by Respondent without being in vio-
lation of the 600 foot requirement, Respondent quietly observed 
Petitioner expend large sums on the facility in question. 
Then, after the facility was completed, and for no apparent rea-
son, the interpretation of the 600 foot requirement was changed. 
The change came without any demonstrated change in legislative 
policy, and in spite of the first opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral which had alerted Respondent to the fact that the 1977 
Legislature could be approached to make appropriate changes if 
-13-
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the interpretation of the Attorney General was deemed to be 
incorrect. 
It is submitted that an injustice was perpetrated 
and that the application of estoppel to Respondent is the nec-
essary remedy - if the Court sanctions Respondent's second 
interpretation of the 600 foot limitation. To not estop Res-
pondent from enforcing its second interpretation against Pet-
itioner will promote a substantial injustice and will be tan-
tamount to a judicial approval of abuse of administrative 
power. 
Petitioner is not unmindful of the fact that the 
Utah Liquor Control Commission has been given broad powers to 
regulate alcoholic beverages in the State of Utah. Utah Code 
Annotated §32-l-6 (Supp. 1977). But in the exercise of those 
powers, Respondent must act reasonably and fairly and not 
arbitrarily as it did here. Once Respondent has exercised its 
powers by promulgating regulations and establishing rules 
of procedure, Respondent may not ignore those rules and reg-
ulations with impunity, particularly when to do so will 
inflict serious injury on citizens of this State. 
The course of conduct pursued by the Utah Liquor Con-
trol Commission is not in keeping with fundamental notions of 
fair play and has denied to Petitioner due process of law un-
-14-
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der Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicable survey to be considered is the one 
under which both Petitioner and Respondent have operated from 
the beginning, i.e., the survey which uses as one measuring 
point the closest boundary of the playground. 
The terminal points of the measurement should be 
(1) the closest boundary of the playground and (2) the location 
of the proposed state liquor store. Such a measurement results 
in Petitioner being in compliance with the 600 foot requirement. 
If it is decided that the change in interpretation 
applies the proper standard of measurement, Respondent should 
be estopped to deny a license on the basis of the 600 foot 
requirement, for Respondent acted in a manner which factually 
supports estoppel and in a manner which did not meet standards 
of essential fairness, thus denying to Petitioner due process 
of law. 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two (2) copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Attorney General, State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
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